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Background The latest outbreak of Ebola in West Africa overwhelmed 
the affected countries, with the impact on health extending far be-
yond Ebola–related deaths that have exceeded 11 000. The need to 
promptly mobilise resources to control emerging infections is widely 
recognized. Yet, data on research funding for emerging infections re-
mains inadequately documented.
Methods We defined research investment as all funding flows for 
Ebola and/or Marburg virus from 1997 to April 2015 whose primary 
purpose was to advance knowledge and new technologies to prevent 
or cure disease. We sourced data directly from funding organizations 
and estimated the investment in 2015 US dollars (US$).
Results Funding for Ebola and Marburg virus research in 1997 to 
2015 amounted to US$ 1.035 billion, including US$ 435.4 million 
(42.0%) awarded in 2014 and 2015. Public sources of funding in-
vested US$ 758.8 million (73.1%), philanthropic sources US$ 65.1 
million (6.3%), and joint public/private/philanthropic ventures ac-
counted for US$ 213.8 million (20.6%). Prior to the Ebola outbreak 
in 2014, pre–clinical research dominated research with US$ 443.6 
million (73.9%) investment. After the outbreak, however, investment 
for new product development increased 942.7–fold and that for clin-
ical trials rose 23.5–fold. Investment in new tools to control Ebola 
and Marburg virus amounted to US$ 399.1 million, with 61.3% 
awarded for vaccine research, 29.2% for novel therapeutics research 
such as antivirals and convalescent blood products, and 9.5% for di-
agnostics research. Research funding and bibliometric output were 
moderately associated (Spearman’s ρ = 0.5232, P = 0.0259), however 
number of Ebola cases in previous outbreaks and research funding 
(ρ = 0.1706, P = 0.4985) and Ebola cases in previous outbreaks and 
research output (ρ = 0.3020, P = 0.0616) were poorly correlated.
Conclusion Significant public and philanthropic funds have been in-
vested in Ebola and Marburg virus research in 2014 and 2015, follow-
ing the outbreak in West Africa. Long term, strategic vision and leader-
ship are needed to invest in infections with pandemic potential early, 
including innovative financing measures and open access investment 
data to promote the development of new therapies and technologies.
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The 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa is the largest recorded in history, 
infecting almost 30 000 individuals by January 2016 and killing over 
11 000 people [1].
The challenge with emerging infections is managing uncertainty, as there 
are many unknown epidemiological and pathophysiological factors. Glob-
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al surveillance systems are incomplete [2], and health sys-
tems responses among interdependent countries vary, put-
ting at risk countries bordering others where the response 
is weak [3]. Experience responding to the HIV, SARS and 
Avian Influenza H5N1 epidemics suggests that the cost of 
inaction, and delayed response to emerging infections, can 
be significant to human health, the global economy, secu-
rity and stability [4].
The Ebola outbreak epitomises a largely failed global re-
sponse, with delayed action by leading international agen-
cies. Weak health systems, a lack of information and all but 
absent surveillance systems in West Africa among Ebola–
affected countries have hampered efforts to control the cur-
rent outbreak. The lack of a licensed vaccine or effective 
therapeutic drugs has contributed to the uncontrollable 
surge in cases and inability to control Ebola transmission 
beyond traditional infection control practices.
As with infection control measures and strong health sys-
tems, research and development (R&D) plays an important 
role in mitigating risk from emerging infections. Funding 
for R&D in global health and infectious diseases has risen 
since 2000 [5]. However, several studies from the US [6], 
United Kingdom (UK) [7], Spain [8], Australia [9] and 
Norway [10] suggest low levels of R&D funding and a lack 
of reliable data for neglected diseases and low–income set-
tings [11]. Research also indicates a paucity of funding for 
other conditions for which there is no sizeable market, for 
example women during pregnancy and neonates [12,13].
More recently, studies have presented systematic analysis 
of public and philanthropic financing of infectious disease 
research in the UK to show a predominant focus on pre-
clinical and laboratory research across a wide range of in-
fections and crosscutting disciplines such as diagnostics, 
therapeutics, and vaccines [7]. Research funding, however, 
was not well aligned to disease burden and followed colo-
nial ties rather than need [14]. To our knowledge, there 
have been no studies quantifying funding for filovirus re-
search.
We present the first systematic analysis of global funding 
for research and emergency response for Ebola and Mar-
burg virus infections. The primary purpose of the study is 
to quantify global research funding for filovirus research 
prior to, and following, the largest recorded outbreak of 
Ebola virus.
METHODS
Measures of research investment were sourced directly 
from funding organizations, data on disease burden from 
the Global Burden of Disease Study 2012, and bibliometric 
impact from the Elsevier Scopus database. The study forms 
part of a wider project entitled RESIN: Research Invest-
ments in Global Health. A full list of keywords, definitions, 
categories, sources of funding and data sets are available 
online (http://www.researchinvestments.org/ebola) and in 
Appendix S1 of the Online Supplementary Document.
We included studies that focused on Ebola infection in hu-
mans, or animal studies with a clear zoonotic component. 
For completeness, we also screened and systematically an-
alyzed research investments for Marburg virus and Cueva-
virus, two other related filoviruses, as funding for these vi-
ruses are often joint. No studies on filovirus Cuevavirus 
were identified, and it was therefore excluded from the 
scope of this analysis.
Data sources and collection
We sourced information from websites, funding organiza-
tion databases, and the published literature. Data from the 
UK, European Union (EU) and the US were included for 
the period of 1997 to 16 April 2015, which represented a 
12–month period following the announcement of the out-
break by the WHO. Variables collected included study title, 
abstract, website, grant type, funding awarded, name and 
gender of the principal investigator, host institution, year 
of award and projected duration of project.
In the UK, research funding organisations included the UK 
Medical Research Council (MRC), the Wellcome Trust, the 
UK Department for International Development (DFID); in 
the EU organisations included the European Commission, 
the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC); and in the US organisations included the Nation-
al Institutes of Health (NIH), Congressionally Directed 
Medical Research Programmes (CDMRP), Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation, Paul G. Allen Foundation, Burroughs 
Wellcome Fund, Doris Duke Charitable Foundation, How-
ard Hughes Medical Institute, Donaghue Foundation, El-
lison Medical Foundation, Arcus Foundation, and the Roy 
Carver Charitable Trust. The organisations selected repre-
sented the leading infectious disease and public health re-
search funders in the respective regions. Variables collected 
included financial disbursements, project title, website, do-
nor organization, recipient organization, recipient country, 
and year of award.
Data management
All grant funding amounts were reported in 2015 US dol-
lars (US$). All awards were adjusted for inflation and con-
verted to US dollars, using the mean exchange rate in the 
year award (http://www.oanda.com). Grants were not mod-
ified according to levels of overheads applied to the award. 
For multi–center studies, the distribution of funding was 
accounted for, where openly available. Unfunded studies, 
or studies without a clear funding amount, were excluded. 
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Private sector sources of funding were excluded, as data 
was not openly available. Channels without a robust data 
source were excluded from the final analysis.
Data were collected over a period of 7 months, from Octo-
ber 2014 to April 2015. The study title, abstract, and web-
site were used to filter and categorise research studies. All 
research studies were reviewed by two or more co–authors. 
Each research award was allocated to one of five R&D cat-
egories along with the research pipeline: preclinical re-
search, phase 1, 2, or 3 clinical trials, product development, 
public health research, and cross–disciplinary research. 
Public health research included surveillance, epidemiology, 
modeling, bioinformatics, and operational research. Cross–
disciplinary studies were large–scale projects, with signifi-
cant funds to facilitate two or more subprojects to work in 
parallel. Duration of research studies was also estimated. 
Top 3 donors were ranked for each recipient organization.
Statistical analysis
Microsoft Excel 2011 (Microsoft, Seattle WA, USA) was 
used to categorise the research studies and generation of 
tables. Statistical analysis and generation of figures and 
graphs were generated using Stata (version 11.2) (STATA 
Corp LLP, College Station, Texas, USA). Simple regression 
analyses were reported using Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient (ρ), to assess the degree of correlation between 
research investment, disease burden, and bibliometric im-
pact. We used fold differences to compare total investment, 
number of studies, mean and median grant size.
Role of the funding source
There was no funding source for this study. The corre-
sponding author had full access to all the data in the study 
and had final responsibility for the decision to submit for 
publication.
RESULTS
Figure 1 shows the total research investment in Ebola and 
Marburg virus from 1997 to 2015 in US$, disaggregated 
by virus, location of award, source of funding, and recipi-
ent of funding, respectively.
Figure 1. Total and proportionate investment in research funding by filovirus (A), by geographical location of lead research institution 
(B), by source of funding (C), and by recipient of funding (D), in 2015 US$, 1997–2015.
A B
C D
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The total research funding awarded over the 18–year time 
period was US$ 1.035 billion, including US$ 435.4 million 
(42.0%) disbursed in 2014 and 2015 during the West Af-
rica Ebola outbreak. Ebola virus received US$ 652.4 mil-
lion (63.0%), Marburg virus received US$ 34.9 million 
(3.4%) and cross–cutting filovirus research received US$ 
348.3 million (33.6%).
Relative contributions by Ebola and Marburg virus changed 
substantially over time, with significant increases in 2003 
(from US$ 5.2 million in 2002 to US$ 19.4 in 2003), in 
2007 (from US$ 16.5 million in 2006 to US$ 45.7 million 
in 2007) and in 2014 (from US$ 59.6 million in 2013 to 
US$ 164.0 million in 2014) respectively (Figure 1).
There is clear dominance in research funding awarded by 
the US, with large rises in 2014 and the 1st quarter of 2015. 
Large proportions of global research funding are invested 
in institutions in the European Union, such as the UK with 
a total of US$ 152.5 million, Germany with a total of US$ 
66.0 million, and France with a total of US$ 49.4 million 
over the 15–month period January 2014–April 2015. In-
stitutions in the US were awarded a total of US$ 110.1 mil-
lion during the same time period, predominantly in 2014 
(83.2%) (Table 1).
Public sources of funding accounted for the majority of to-
tal investment in Ebola and Marburg research with US$ 
758.8 million (73.1%). Philanthropic sources awarded US$ 
65.1 million (6.3%), and joint public–philanthropic or 
public–private funding accounting for US$ 213.8 million 
(20.6%), including a further US$ 90.8 million by the Eu-
ropean Commission (Table 1).
Publicly funded institutions received a total of US$ 346.7 
million (33.5%) research funding. Private, for profit insti-
tutions received a total of US$ 233.6 million (22.6%) and 
philanthropic, non–profit institutions received a total of 
US$ 455.3 million (44.0%). In other words, for every US$ 
1 invested by a public funding source, a public institution 
received US$ 0.46. For every US$ 1 invested by a private 
funding source, a for–profit organization received US$ 
2.03, and for every US$ 1 invested by a philanthropic fund-
ing source, a non–profit organization received US$ 7.00. 
Universities received the largest investment in Ebola and 
Marburg virus disbursements with US$ 579.1 million 
(55.9%) followed by Research Institutions with US$ 296.0 
million (28.6%) and biopharmaceutical companies with 
US$ 229.3 million (22.1%).
Figure 2 shows the research investment according to type 
of research along the R&D pipeline between 1997–2015. 
Prior to the outbreak, pre–clinical research dominated re-
search with US$ 443.6 million (73.9%) investment. Per 
annum investment prior to the Ebola outbreak in West Af-
rica, annual research funding was US$ 35.3 million over a 
period of 17 years. Following the outbreak, annual research 
funding increased 9.5–fold to US$ 337.1 million.
In 2014 and 2015, a 942.7–fold increase in product devel-
opment and 23.5–fold increase in clinical trials was ob-
served (Table 2). Analyzing data from 1997–2013, there 
was a moderate association between research funding and 
research output (ρ = 0.5232, P = 0.0259), however Ebola 
cases in previous outbreaks and research funding 
(ρ = 0.1706, P = 0.4985) and Ebola cases in previous out-
breaks and research output (ρ = 0.3020, P = 0.0616) were 
Table 1. Investments by public, private and philanthropic funders for Ebola research
Funding awarded, uS$ % Type oF organizaTion Funding received, uS$ % raTio inveSTmenT:award
Public funding: 756 792 968 73.1 Public institution: 346 738 377 33.5 1:0.46
NIH/NIAID 651 044 589 62.9 University 291 139 730 28.1
European Commission 93 822 622 9.1 Research Institute 212 219 525 20.5
German government 4 996 424 0.5 Public Health Institute 63 925 988 6.2
CDC PHPR 4 634 854 0.4 Non–profit organization: 455 291 509 44.0 1:7
CDMRP 2 232 070 0.2 University 287 955 319 27.8
Philanthropic funding: 65 064 309 6.3 Research Institute 80 249 373 7.7
Gates Foundation 52 713 304 5.1 Public Health Institute 60 059 515 5.8
Wellcome Trust 11 085 919 1.1 NGO 20 765 944 2.0
Burroughs Wellcome Fund 601 000 0.1 Hospital 6 261 358 0.6
Ellison Medical Foundation 263 200 0.0 For–profit organization: 233 591 124 22.6 1:2
Paul G. Allen Foundation 170 416 0.0 Biopharmaceuticals 229 370 939 22.1
Arcus Foundation 121 832 0.0 Research Institute 3 491 497 0.3
Roy Carver Charitable Trust 108 638 0.0 Technology 728 688 0.1
Joint funding: 213 763 733 20.6
EFPIA 114 980 222 11.1
European Commission 90 797 873 8.8
Wellcome Trust/DFID/MRC 8 048 047 0.8
Total Ebola research funding 1 035 621 010 100
CDMRP – Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programme, CDC PHPR – CDC Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, NIH – Na-
tional Institutes of Health, NIAID – National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, EFPIA – European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and 
Associations, DFID – UK Department for International Development
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provide an enabling environment to strategically allocate 
scarce resources [15].
We demonstrate significant public and philanthropic funds 
have been invested in Ebola and Marburg virus research in 
2014 and 2015.
Evaluating the impact of R&D is not only good science, but 
also a social imperative. The responsibility to invest appro-
priately lies both with researchers, and with funding or-
ganisations. Policymakers must work closely with the sci-
entific and funding communities to facilitate channels that 
provide both the flexibility and the strategic resources to 
alleviate the burden of emerging infections. Evidence–in-
formed investment is key to allocating resources wisely and 
fairly. Our analyses provide a first step in aggregating and 
describing the trends with Ebola and Marburg viruses, in 
Figure 2. Total investment in Ebola and Marburg research by 
R&D pipeline, in 2015 US$, 1997–2015.
Table 2. Investment in R&D pipeline by focus of Ebola research
1997–2013 2014–2015
US$ % Per annum US$ % Per annum Fold difference
Preclinical: 443 570 456 73.9 26 092 380 78 755 577 18.1 60 972 060 2.3
Host–pathogen 255 676 031 42.6 15 039 767 21 317 338 4.9 16 503 746 1.1
Non–human primates 204 216 041 34.0 12 012 708 16 560 952 3.8 12 821 382 1.1
Clinical trials: 116 942 041 19.5 6 878 944 208 852 606 48.0 161 692 340 23.5
Phase 1 116 942 041 19.5 6 878 944 153 285 276 35.2 118 672 472 17.3
Phase 2–3 – – – 55 567 330 12.8 43 019 868 –
Product development: 1 015 328 0.2 59 725 72 726 099 16.7 56 304 077 942.7
Cross–disciplinary: 11 057 065 1.8 650 416 – 0.0 – –
Public health research: 27 581 023 4.6 1 622 413 75 120 815 17.3 58 158 050 35.8
Surveillance 19 840 535 3.3 1 167 090 20 260 954 4.7 15 685 900 13.4
Epidemiology 6 329 902 1.1 372 347 5 795 974 1.3 4 487 206 12.1
Modeling 501 655 0.1 29 509 433 870 0.1 335 899 11.4
Bioinformatics 908 931 0.2 53 467 224 085 0.1 173 485 3.2
Operational research – – – 48 405 932 11.1 37 475 560 –
Subtotal 600 165 913 100 35 303 877 435 455 097 100 337 126 527 9.5
Total research funding 1 035 621 010
poorly correlated (Figure 3). Investment in innovative tech-
nologies for Ebola and Marburg virus amounted to US$ 
399.1 million, with 61.3% awarded for vaccine research, 
29.2% for novel therapeutics research such as antivirals and 
convalescent blood products, and 9.5% for diagnostics re-
search (Table 3).
DISCUSSION
Implications of mapping research funding
Emerging infections have the potential to disrupt the glob-
al economy and global health, mobilising significant re-
sources over short periods of time. In an effort to learn from 
the latest Ebola outbreak in West Africa and prevent the 
next epidemic, data on current investments, coupled with 
data on disease burden and efficacy of interventions, may 
Figure 3. Research bibliometrics output over time with total 
Ebola cases per annum between 1977–2013.
Ebola research funding
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an effort to develop more sensitive methods to evaluate the 
public health impact of supported research.
What the Ebola crisis in West Africa has demonstrated is 
the immense repercussions of an outbreak on the stability 
and social cohesion of a society. The spread of the outbreak 
is linked to the under–developed and under–resourced 
health systems preexisting within these countries, but also 
the imbalance between investments in the diseases that af-
fect individuals in wealthier countries over those living in 
low–income settings [16].
Proposals for research strategy
New approaches for research during a new epidemic or 
pandemic are critical, and useful examples include the 
2009 NIHR “Rapid Response” research funding for influ-
enza [17], and the 2011 NIHR “Sleeping grants” where 
protected funding will be activated in the event of a new 
pandemic [18].
A portfolio of research along the R&D value chain (extend-
ing from preclinical and laboratory science, phase 1 and 
phase 2 clinical trials, large–scale phase 3 and phase for 
clinical trials, translational studies and evaluations) is re-
quired to address the greatest challenges in global health. 
Investing in the progression and links between these dif-
ferent types of research is essential in order to build on ear-
ly stage research findings, and translate breakthroughs in 
the laboratory into reality in health systems where transla-
tion and uptake of innovations remains a challenge [19,20]. 
Operations research is critical to understand how innova-
tions can be effectively scaled up [21,22].
Encouragingly, the scope and volume of potential Ebola 
diagnostics, therapies and vaccines is broadening (Box 1).
R&D should also extend beyond vaccines, diagnostics, and 
antivirals, however. Research into novel, digital surveillance 
systems is also warranted. Surveillance systems are essen-
tial to detect outbreaks of emerging infections, and to mit-
igate their health, security and economic effects, in all 
countries [27,28]. The International Health Regulations 
(IHR) confers responsibilities to WHO member states to 
Box 1 Summary of current research for Ebola diagnostics, 
therapies and vaccines.
Research is currently under way to investigate the therapeu-
tic potential of favipiravir (Toyama Chemical, Japan) and con-
valescent whole blood and plasma treatment [23]. Clinical 
trials in Liberia of brincidofovir (Chimerix; NC, USA) with 
Médecins Sans Frontières and the Wellcome Trust were dis-
continued due to paucity of numbers recruited. Should these 
front–runners fail to show promise, 10–15 pre–qualified 
products may become the next candidates. Zmapp (Mapp 
Biopharmaceuticals; CA, USA) was not selected as part of the 
early research candidates due to availability issues.
Efficacy trials for an Ebola vaccine have begun in February 
2015, 14 months after the estimated start of the outbreak, 
using a randomized ring vaccination design adopted with 
the smallpox eradication campaign [24]. In clarifying their 
position, Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, has approved US$ 300 
million spending on vaccine procurement and US$ 90 mil-
lion on strengthening immunisation systems [25]. The over-
arching aim is to enable vaccine development for emerging 
infections by recognizing the lack of market potential, build-
ing laboratory and outbreak investigation capabilities in 
country, create repositories of potential agents and catalog 
immunological properties, and develop vaccine vectors. Two 
candidates exist: GlaxoSmithKline's ChAd3–ZEBOV and 
Merck's rVSV–Ebov. Further preclinical vaccine candidates 
include Johnson & Johnson's recombinant vector regimen, 
a recombinant nanoparticle vaccine by Novavax, a recom-
binant influenza vaccine developed by the Russian Ministry 
of Health, a Venezuela equine encephalitis replicon Ebola 
vaccine developed by the US Army Medical Research Insti-
tute for Infectious Diseases, and possibly a further vaccine 
developed by the Chinese Army. The imperative to invest in 
emerging infections or diseases with high mortality rates lies 
in the fact that suboptimal evidence may be generated dur-
ing an outbreak, due to the urge to develop therapies with-
out randomized controlled trials. Randomization is essential 
in Ebola drug trials, as it is with cancer trials [26]. An as-
sumption that a therapy will be effective is inappropriate for 
generating evidence, and harm may be the price of introduc-
ing this bias. Strategic health investment can go a long way 
to ensuring sufficient innovation in science is being fostered, 
preventing a reliance on insufficient and potentially wasteful 
products toward the end of the R&D pipeline.
Table 3. Investment in innovation in Ebola research by type of institution
vaccineS diagnoSTicS TherapeuTicS
US$ % US$ % US$ % Total %
Research Institute 108 615 512 44.4 7 832 065 20.6 21 464 466 18.5 137 912 043 34.6
Biopharmaceuticals 93 932 058 38.4 9 861 635 25.9 27 752 433 23.9 131 546 126 33.0
University 30 429 464 12.4 20 046 125 52.6 60 181 420 51.7 110 657 009 27.7
NGO 11 667 539 4.8 – – 1 376 869 1.2 13 044 408 3.3
Hospital – – – – 5 466 616 4.7 5 466 616 1.4
Public Health Institute – – 369 008 1.0 94 611 0.1 463 619 0.1
Subtotal 244 644 573 61.3 38 108 833 9.5 116 336 415 29.2 399 089 821 38.5
Total research funding 1 035 621 010
Fitchett et al.
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develop surveillance systems to detect and respond to pub-
lic health emergencies, although many are not ready [29]. 
IHR provides a mandate for global surveillance, a safety net 
to detect disease outbreaks if they are not detected and/or 
reported by countries. Responsive health systems and glob-
al collaboration is critically important if these infections are 
to be rapidly contained [30,31]. In 2002, the Global Pub-
lic Health Intelligence Network, developed by the Public 
Health Agency of Canada, openly alerted the global health 
community to SARS 2 months prior to the WHO. In 2014, 
HealthMap sounded the alarm to an outbreak of unknown 
etiology in Guinea 9 days before the WHO. Recent work 
has further highlighted the density of Google Trends 
searches for Ebola in West Africa, despite inadequate Inter-
net coverage in the region [32]. These factors together 
highlight the need for research into digital systems for glob-
al health security.
Limitations and scope
The primary limitation to this work is the difference in qual-
ity of research funding, compared with emergency response 
funding. Although public and philanthropic research fund-
ing is, on the whole, well documented and often openly ac-
cessible online, there are clear quality concerns with emer-
gency response funding. For instance, it is difficult to verify 
disbursements and pledges for emergency response, and 
this is a notable problem with the latest Ebola outbreak. As 
published in the Lancet Global Health – the tools “for track-
ing resources in a crisis are not fit for purpose” [33]. Despite 
the challenges with emergency response funding, it is im-
portant to document the openly published information, sys-
tematically analyze the data and start a discussion on next 
steps in tracking resources during a crisis. We need a robust 
financial platform to monitor and evaluate investments – 
with the capacity to cross–talk with research funding com-
mitments. With the re–emergence of Zika virus in the Amer-
icas, this needs to occur without delay.
There are also limitations to analyzing global expenditure 
data search, elaborated in greater detail in a recent article 
by Young and colleagues [34]. The first is the challenge of 
comparing data collected from different countries. The Fra-
scati manual attempts to provide some guidance on the 
data collection and currency adjustments for R&D [35]. 
Despite some clear guidance, two recent studies highlight 
the ongoing difficulties with methodology and subsequent 
impact on interpretation, particularly due to discrepancies 
in data conversion [36–38]. The second is the lack of indi-
ces to convert health R&D expenditure to a single, com-
monly used currency [38]. One of the main reasons this is 
important is the comparative difference in the costs of in-
put for R&D in different settings [39]. There are two pos-
sible ways of converting to a common currency: current 
exchange rates, and GDP purchasing power parities (PPPs) 
[40]. The Frascati manual recommends GDP PPPs, and 
current exchange rates may underestimate the contribu-
tions of countries such India and China, by overstating the 
costs of R&D. The third is the need to adjust investment 
over time, in order to account for the potential role of in-
flation. There is currently no index specific for health R&D 
and the Frascati manual advocates for using the GDP price 
index, with the limitation that is not specific for R&D. The 
special R&D deflator is an index adopted by the US Na-
tional Institutes of Health and may be adopted for high–
income settings [41]. Using this index for settings with high 
inflation will overestimate respective contributions, and 
vice versa. The fourth challenge relates to the need first to 
deflate data in national currency, then to covert the adjust-
ed data to a common currency using a selected base year 
[42]. Altering data using another mechanism may skew the 
data inappropriately and alter the comparability between 
settings. Fifth, our study is likely to underestimate research 
funding, partly due to the lack of openly available data from 
the pharmaceutical industry. Sixth challenge relates to dif-
ficulties in ascertaining the right proportion of a grant al-
located to a specific disease, when there are multiple re-
search sites and conditions researched, which is not 
uncommon for co–infection studies.
Strategic coordination of research funding
A Global Observatory on health R&D has been proposed 
by member states of the sixty–sixth World Health Assem-
bly in 2013 to “provide a mechanism to monitor and anal-
yse relevant existing information on health R&D, including 
resource flows, product pipelines, and research outputs, 
with a view to contributing to the identification of gaps and 
opportunities for health R&D and to inform priority–set-
ting for new R&D investments based on the public health 
needs of the world’s poorest countries” [43,44].
A clear, open source repository for R&D investment data 
could address the problem by showing the funding land-
scape of both clinical and non–clinical studies in real time 
[45]. Gaps in the data highlight the need for a global health 
R&D observatory. Innovations in reporting will help im-
prove priority setting to address burden of disease in low– 
and middle–income settings. Interpreting disease burden 
data in the context of R&D funding data are an essential step 
in the equitable allocation of health investments. Whether 
the observatory should be run by the WHO or by another 
institution or consortium, however, remains for debate.
CONCLUSIONS
Over 20 years after a landmark publication by the Institute 
of Medicine, emerging and re–emerging infectious diseases 
continue pose a serious threat globally to human and ani-
Ebola research funding
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inter–pandemic research, pre–pandemic research and es-
tablished pandemic research.
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